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ABSTRACT: Speculative realism has, over the course of its rapid and controversial emergence in 
the past decade, been frequently criticized from the perspective of historical materialism, for its 
putative reliance on abstraction and eschewal of a sufficiently rigorous ideological alignment. 
This paper takes such critiques as a starting point for an examination of the contributions 
recent thought in the area of speculative realism has to offer the study of the humanities – 
specifically, the study of literature and literary history. In particular, contemporary realist 
thought has the potential to enable scholars of literature to move beyond the anthropocentric 
and specialized notions of history as an exclusively cultural entity, which have dominated the 
discipline since the twentieth century. Paying especially close attention to the work of Graham 
Harman and Manuel DeLanda, it is my argument that emergent realist philosophy offers 
literary scholars a set of powerful conceptual tools which can be put toward the work of 
accounting for the hitherto neglected ontological status of the literary text – illuminating the 
status of the text as a particular variety of real and physical object that participates in a system 
of real and physical history and memory. 
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Bruno Latour reserves some of his harshest treatment in We Have Never Been Modern for 
humanistic scholarship – for its meek acquiescence to modernity’s schism between 
human subjects and nonhuman things, for its endorsement of the bifurcation between 
nature and culture, and for its obsession with the marginalia of linguistic 
representation. Latour writes: 
Are you not fed up with language games, and with the eternal skepticism of the 
deconstruction of meaning? Discourse is not a world unto itself but a population 
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of actants that mix with things as well as with societies, uphold the former and 
latter alike, and hold on to them both.1 
As Latour elaborates, the most the humanities can hope to accomplish with its favored 
‘language games’ is the defense and maintenance of the ‘fuzzy’ areas on the margins of 
the world of culture – a rearguard action in defense of minor, marginal, and oppressed 
representations from the encroachment of totalizing modernity. This defense of 
marginality, Latour writes, ‘presupposes the existence of a totalitarian center.’2 As 
Graham Harman relates in Prince of Networks, Latour often describes this concession as 
‘“an intellectual Munich”, referring to Neville Chamberlain’s surrender of the Czech 
frontier without a struggle.’3 This can be seen in the sort of cottage industry that has 
sprung up, in recent years, at the Chronicle of Higher Education and other such 
publications, in the regular production of articles on the various crises befalling the 
American university system and, in particular, the arts and humanities. This crisis in 
the arts and humanities has become something of a commonplace, a domesticated 
state of affairs, an institutional feature of American discourse on the academy. To 
borrow Latour’s metaphor, it seems that our own Munich happened some time ago. 
Or it is perhaps an ongoing event, a process of rearguard actions, taken in response to 
demands for accountability, for answers to the most frequent interrogations directed at 
the humanities.  
In the interest of further examining the event that is the apparent crisis in the 
humanities, it will be helpful to narrow our perspective to a specific segment grouped 
under the broad and saggy big tent of the humanities – for the purposes of this project, 
we will consider the interpretative work of literary studies. Literature is particularly 
well suited as an exemplum here, and, I like to think, for reasons that extend beyond 
my own arbitrary intellectual interests. The commonsensical view of contemporary 
literary scholarship and criticism, painted in broad strokes, is one of a discipline 
devoted to the study of excessively abstract, theorized, solipsistic, and (in an apparent 
contradiction) narrow slices of cultural life. Such a commonplace can be ascertained 
with no more than a quick search for the terms ‘English or ‘literature’ on the website 
of the Chronicle or one of its equivalents. A cursory scan of the articles retrieved reveals 
that the majority of articles on the topic are concerned with either expressing, or with 
responding to one of two general categories of critique. This critique is expressed, 
generally speaking, in the form of variations on two questions: utility (what is literature 
good for? what does literature have to do with the real world?), and ideology (what is the political 
agenda of literary studies?). 
1 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter, Cambridge, Harvard UP, 1993, p. 90. 
2 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, p. 91. 
3 Graham Harman, Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics, Melbourne, re.press, 2009, p. 61. 
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My concern here is, primarily, with the stance adopted in literary scholarship with 
regards to the first of these questions. In order to properly address and overcome such 
utilitarian critiques of the study of literature, we must first reevaluate long-beloved 
concepts of the ontological status of the literary text. The currently predominant 
understanding of the ontological status of literature, on those infrequent occasions 
when this status is considered at all, is one that is fundamentally anti-realist. This 
attitude is in keeping with wider trends in the sort of post-modern thought that 
underwrites the theoretical work of the humanities in general – an attitude of 
dismissal, verging on disgust. Manuel DeLanda, a self-described realist philosopher, 
aptly describes the prevalent attitude: ‘’for decades admitting that one was a realist was 
equivalent to acknowledging [that] one was a child molester.’4 With regards to 
continental philosophy, this attitude has begun to weaken in recent years – in the face 
of persisting, frequent opposition and criticism – with the emergence of a number of 
varied and vocal espousers of realism, among them DeLanda, as well as Graham 
Harman, to whom DeLanda addressed the above-quoted description of continental 
attitudes toward realism. These newly emergent realist philosophies offer literary 
scholars a set of powerful conceptual tools, which can be put toward the work of 
accounting for the ontological status of the literary text as a particular variety of real 
and physical object that participates in a system of real and physical history and 
memory. 
There is a resonance between the types of questions that are most frequently 
directed at scholars of literature, and the types of questions that inevitably come up 
over the course of debates over the varieties of speculative thought that have emerged 
over the course of the past two decades – speculative realism (SR), object-oriented 
philosophy (OOP), and object-oriented ontology (OOO), and their familial relations. 
In much the same manner as literary studies, the varied strains of speculative thought 
are frequently interrogated – attacked, even – on the basis of questions pertaining to 
their applicability/utility (in general, a perennial favorite for critics of the arts and 
humanities across the entirety of the spectrum), and on the basis of questions of 
ideology and politics. The explication of this parallel is not intended as a simple 
exercise in the description of resemblance (as mentioned above, the deployment of 
such critiques is hardly limited to English and philosophy departments; and, as we will 
see in subsequent discussion below, the use of such a strategy in any inquiry into 
questions of being has a way of leading to arguments based upon nothing more than 
simple resemblance). In examining the sort of questions and arguments that are 
4 Graham Harman, ‘DeLanda’s ontology: assemblage and realism,’ Continental Philosophy Review, vol. 41, 
2008, pp. 367-383, p. 368. 
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directed at English and speculative philosophy (and, to a lesser extent, the humanities 
in general), we can investigate and account for the limitations of the sort of ‘language 
games’ that are deployed in the critique favored by the currently predominant 
approaches to the text in Western English departments – that is, the various iterations 
of poststructuralism, historicism, and their fellow travelers.  
The publication, early in 2013, in Critical Inquiry of Alex Galloway’s article, ‘The 
Poverty of Philosophy: Realism and Post-Fordism,’ set off a mid-sized online kerfuffle, 
and provides us with a suitable example of the second of the two lines of inquiry 
mentioned above –challenges to SR in the form of questions of politics and ideology. 
Near the conclusion of his article, Galloway articulates this question as follows:  
Do movements like object-oriented philosophy and speculative realism have a 
politics and, if so, what is it? And, even more important, Malabou’s opening 
challenge, slightly rephrased: What should we do so that thinking does not purely 
and simply coincide with the spirit of capitalism?5  
Galloway largely bases his critique of speculative realism on two – somewhat 
contradictory – premises. First, he equates the ontology of object-oriented philosophy 
with, strangely, Java and other object-oriented computer programming languages that 
‘are themselves the heart and soul of the information economy, which if it is not 
synonymous with today’s mode of production is certainly intimately intertwined with 
it.’6 Following a somewhat out-of-place explication of Badiou’s work on mathematics, 
Galloway concludes that that a ‘congruity exists between how Badiou talks about 
ontology and how capitalism structures its world of business objects’ – how Galloway 
hopes to account for Badiou’s vocal Maoism here is, of course, unclear.7 Galloway 
extends this discussion of Badiou to the work Meillassoux and Harman, implying that 
the realist ontologies of SR and OOO (defined in the broadest terms) are somehow 
predisposed to complicity in capitalist hegemony. 
Second, Galloway attacks SR on the basis of its lack of a sufficiently rigorous 
ideology. Realism, he writes, is an ‘unaligned politics’ and, thus ‘dangerous.’8 
Galloway contrasts this with his own chosen blend of historical materialism, structured 
according to the principle that, everything ‘should be rooted in material life and 
history, not in abstraction, logical necessity, universality, essence, pure form, spirit, or 
idea.’9 The ‘true poverty of the new realism,’ he writes, lies in ‘its inability to recognize 
5 Alexander Galloway, ‘The Poverty of Philosophy: Realism and Post-Fordism,’ Critical Inquiry, vol. 39, no. 
2, 2013, pp. 347-366, p. 364. 
6 Galloway, ‘The Poverty of Philosophy,’ p. 351. 
7 Galloway, ‘The Poverty of Philosophy,’ p. 352. 
8 Galloway, ‘The Poverty of Philosophy,’ p. 365. 
9 Galloway, ‘The Poverty of Philosophy,’ p. 366. 
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that the highest order of the absolute, the totality itself, is found in the material history 
of mankind.’10 The argument here goes, it seems: unlike Marxist philosophy and 
historical materialism, which are rooted safely in the ground of material history, SR 
relies on abstraction and speculation, which makes it particularly vulnerable to 
manipulation by capitalists for the perpetration of any number of mean and nasty 
capitalist activities. 
Unsurprisingly –given the prolific use of the Internet, and blogs in particular, by 
those scholars associated with SR as a resource for publication and debate – the 
publication of Galloway’s article in Critical Inquiry was met with a rapid flurry of 
refutations, equal parts scathing and humorous, on the blogs of the authors most 
commonly associated with the SR ‘movement.’ Levi Bryant, easily the most prolific of 
the bloggers associated with SR and OOO, responded to Galloway in a number of 
lengthy essays on his Larval Subjects blog. In the post  
Pluripotency: Some Remarks on Galloway,’ Bryant takes issue with Galloway’s 
apparent assumption of the existence of ‘an essence, no matter how historical, to how 
things or objects are deployed within social assemblages.’11 If this line of reasoning is to 
be followed through to its conclusion, the use of object-oriented programming to 
support capitalistic modes of production must necessarily be its only possible use, and 
object-oriented programming must thus be irredeemably ‘capitalist through and 
through.’ Bryant writes: 
If everything is defined by the historical setting in which it emerged, if things– 
above all people –are not pluripotent such that they harbor potentials in excess 
beyond the way they’re related and deployed in the present, then there’s no hope 
for ever changing anything. Everything will be tainted through and through by the 
power dynamics in which it emerged. Everything will be but an expression of those 
networks of power.12 
The problems with such a model of emergence are clear enough – a totalizing 
definition of things, exclusively in terms of their historical situation, does away with 
any potential for agentic action beyond what is determined by the hegemonic 
institutions out of which they emerge. Such an emergence involves very little in the 
way of actual emerging or, for that matter, really any action at all. This is the most 
serious flaw in any zero-sum paradigm, wherein the being of an object can be 
accounted for in terms of its historical determination or in terms of its withdrawal, but 
10 Galloway, ‘The Poverty of Philosophy,’ p. 366. 
11 Levi Bryant, ‘Pluripotency: Some Remarks on Galloway,’ Larval Subjects, 2012, 
< http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/12/12/pluripotency-some-remarks-on-galloway/> [accessed 
20 April 2013]. 
12 Bryant, ‘Pluripotency: Some Remarks on Galloway.’ 
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never accounted for in terms of both historical character and withdrawn character. 
Furthermore, there is the additional tendency in humanist critique to impose even 
further constraints on inquiry into being by adhering to a definition of history that is 
limited to the realm of specifically, and exclusively, human culture. This view begins to 
unravel, as we shall see, when we consider history not as a specifically cultural and 
humanist institution, but instead as the activity of accumulating, organizing, storing, 
presenting and transmitting information about events. 
To reiterate: we are here seeking to move beyond the anthropocentric and anti-
realist ontologies that underwrite contemporary approaches to literary studies. In the 
place of this anti-realist concept of literature, we have posited the alternate ontological 
conception of the text as a particular type of real and physical object that is an active 
participant as part of a wider system of real, physical memory and history. At this 
point it seems that, before proceeding any further with the description of this model of 
literature, it will be necessary to provide some clarification of our descriptive 
terminology – specifically, we must now ask, what is meant by this description of the 
ontological status of the literary text as being both real and physical? These two terms, as 
employed throughout what follows, can be most easily conceived of as they pertain to 
the two primary oversights, described above, of the sort of anti-realist argument that 
critiques speculative realism on the basis of its neglecting the determinative social and 
cultural forces of human material history. These oversights are, to wit: (1), such an 
approach engages in a sort of ontological zero-sum game by overlooking the fact that 
being is both historical and withdrawn, not one or the other; (2), such an approach 
adheres to a notion of history as being exclusively cultural, and somehow hermetically 
sealed from the absolute givenness of the natural realm. This brings us to the term real, 
which pertains here to the notion of withdrawal – this can be described as akin to a 
sort of autonomy, in that a real object is one whose existence is not dependent on its 
manifestation to the human mind. This notion will be of particular importance as we 
examine the ontology of Graham Harman in subsequent pages.  
The term physical is somewhat more slippery in its precise connotation. Physical 
relates to the second flaw in the historical materialist critique of SR – its adherence to 
a view of history as exclusively cultural that imposes an implicit separation between the 
domains of the cultural and the natural. To assert that an object is physical is useful for 
breaking down this pervasive and oft-unnoticed nature/culture divide, in that it 
implies that an object pertains to the sort of natural systems that are characterized and 
produced via the forces of the processes of physics. Just as physical law shapes and 
produces the tendencies that govern the formation and organization of a ‘natural’ 
system, like a coral reef, it equally shapes and produces the tendencies that govern a 
‘cultural’ system, such as a literary text or hermeneutic paradigm. The physical 
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pertains to information, in the sense that Levi Bryant describes it, in The Democracy of 
Objects, in terms of information being a ‘genuine event that befalls a substance or 
happens to a substance.’13 This definition is particularly useful for our purposes here, in 
that it allows for the classification of all manner of diverse systems to be classified as 
informational systems, even those which would otherwise be placed on opposite sides 
of the nature/culture divide. In this regard, the term physical can be said to pertain to 
the historical character of an object, in the sense of history as a term that describes the 
organization and presentation of information about (past) events. 
Having developed – or at least speculated on – the descriptive terminology that 
might be employed in a realist account of the literary text, we can turn to questions of 
articulation which remain, at this point, largely unanswered. Most pressingly, just what 
would a realist account of literature look like? The short answer to this question is: 
bricoleur – perhaps aggravatingly so. The ability to engage, or perhaps indulge, in 
theoretical inconsistency is one of the most appealing perks of contemporary realist 
ontology. As Manuel DeLanda points out in his explication of Deleuze’s philosophy in 
Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, granting autonomy to reality outside of its 
manifestation to human consciousness means it is not necessary for realist philosophers 
to ‘agree about the contents of this mind-independent reality.’14 This is in stark contrast 
to the rigid concern with content that underwrites the ontological framework of the 
non-realist philosopher or critic. As Graham Harman writes, in a 2008 review of 
DeLanda’s book, A New Philosophy of Society: 
DeLanda both claims to be a realist, and is one. The structures of the world 
described in his book require no presence of a human subject on the scene: 
neither a naked Cartesian cogito, nor a flashier post-human condensed from 
language and power games, nor even a Badiouian subject of truth-events.15  
In keeping with this description, a realist account of the work of literature would be 
one that concerns itself not with the reading of the content or context of a text in the 
traditional humanistic sense, but instead with the structural conditions through and by 
which a text emerges, and the ways in which a text participates in an informational 
system of history and memory. A realist account of literature entails an activity more 
akin to mapping than to digging – the work of cartography, instead of archeology. 
In what follows, we will now to turn to an (perhaps overly ambitious) attempt to 
carry out, at the very least, the performance of such a cartographic activity – to map 
the outline of a speculative realist theory of literature. In keeping with the bricoleur 
13 Levi Bryant, The Democracy of Objects, Ann Arbor, Open Humanities Press, 2011, p. 155. 
14 Manuel DeLanda, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, New York, Continuum, 2001, p. 2. 
15 Harman, ‘DeLanda’s ontology: assemblage and realism,’ pp. 370-371. 
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sprit of realism, this articulation draws upon the distinct and, at times, contradictory 
ideas of two realist philosophers, Graham Harman and Manuel DeLanda. In 
Harman’s object-oriented philosophy, we are presented with descriptive concepts with 
which we may account for the autonomy that defines an object and the contours of its 
reality. From DeLanda, and his assemblage theory, we can take with us the concepts 
necessary to account for the physical being of the literary text, and the manner in 
which this helps us to account for literature’s capacity, as information, to affect, create 
difference, and perturb reality. 
Examining historical emergence and the (as yet, largely unaccounted for) being 
and work of literary texts in terms of such an understanding of information requires 
that we, first of all, accept, literary texts in terms of their being objects. Taken at face 
value, this is not an altogether unfamiliar stance for scholars of literature – however, in 
considering texts as being objects, we will find that it is likewise necessary to consider 
human subjects as being objects. Indeed, there is no subject in this regard, at least not 
in the sense of a subject that is anything other than a particular type of object – in the 
object-oriented view, there is no such thing as a privileged subject possessed of a 
comparatively greater or more objective quanta of being. Graham Harman describes 
this position in The Quadruple Object, the introduction of which opens with the assertion 
that our understanding of objects ‘must include those entities that are neither physical 
nor real.’16 These objects are not all equally real but ‘they are equally objects.’17 This 
equal ontological status of being is elided by the predominant variety of humanistic, 
non-realist critical thinking. Harman writes: ‘the labor of the intellect is usually taken 
to be critical rather than naïve. Instead of accepting this inflated menagerie of entities, 
critical thinking debunks objects and denies their autonomy.’18 
Harman elaborates that critical thought denies objects their autonomy by way of 
two main processes. The first of these, which he designates undermining, denies objects 
their autonomy through the assertion that objects are not fundamental. Undermining 
reduces the object downward, making the claims that ‘objects are too specific to 
deserve the name of ultimate reality,’ and are instead all ‘built of some basic physical 
or historical element whose permutations give rise to these objects as a sort of 
derivative product.’19 This concept is the basis of one of the more conspicuous 
differences between the ontologies of Harman and DeLanda, who Harman describes 
16 Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object, Washington, Zero Books, 2011, p. 5. 
17 Harman, The Quadruple Object, p. 5. 
18 Harman, The Quadruple Object, p. 7. 
19 Harman, The Quadruple Object, p. 10. 
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engaging in undermining by way of a sort of Deleuzian-inflected ‘half-hearted 
monism.’20  
Harman refers to the second strategy for denying objects autonomy with the term 
overmining. Whereas undermining reduces objects downward, overmining approaches 
objects from the opposite direction, and views them as important ‘only insofar as they 
are manifested to the mind, or are part of some concrete event that affects other 
objects as well.’21 (11). Harman writes that, despite the difference between the two 
strategies, in terms of the direction from which they regard the object, ‘both positions 
share the notion that a thing’s existence consists solely in its relation with other things. 
An object is exhausted by its presence for another, with no intrinsic reality held 
cryptically in reserve.’22 Harman goes on to argue that the reductive strategies of 
overmining and undermining, favored by predominant paradigms of critical thought, 
both fail to account for the fact that the being of objects can ‘be defined only by their 
autonomous reality.’23 These objects ‘must be autonomous in two separate directions: 
emerging as something over and above their piece, while also partly withholding 
themselves from relations with other entities.’24 This notion of the irreducibility and 
diversity of objects as the fundamental entity of being is the most valuable contribution 
of Harman’s object-oriented philosophy to any speculation on the development of a 
realist account of the literary text. 
At this point, it will be helpful for us to pause a moment and refocus the scale of 
our inquiry to the level of the individual text. Even after – or, perhaps, especially after 
– the domestication of critical theory by the humanities, the individual text remains 
the level at which literary scholars are apparently most comfortable, perhaps because it 
is also the level at which the hermeneutics of close reading operate most effectively. To 
further illustrate our discussion of Harman’s thought thus far, it will be helpful to turn, 
briefly, to this specific textual level. How, exactly does an individual text correspond to 
this definition, much less a set of texts? To illustrate this argument, let’s turn to the 
example of the text of Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice – a familiar enough text, and 
one with an exceptionally tumultuous history of interpretation and reception.  
What sort of play is The Merchant of Venice? The original title informs us that that the 
play is a comedic history – but the play is hardly comedic anymore or, at the very 
least, is very infrequently a cause for laughter. Equally slippery is the question: who 
and what is The Merchant of Venice about?  Whose play it? These days it’s certainly not 
20 Harman, The Quadruple Object, p. 9. 
21 Harman, The Quadruple Object, p. 11. 
22 Harman, The Quadruple Object, p. 12. 
23 Harman, The Quadruple Object, p. 19. 
24 Harman, The Quadruple Object, p. 19. 
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about the titular merchant – Antonio – or, at least not mainly about him. More often, 
it’s a play about Shylock, certainly, but The Merchant of Venice is also a play about anti-
Semitism, apartheid, market capitalism, and any number of themes pertaining to 
otherness; it’s a play set in Venice, but also a play set in New York, and in Auschwitz. 
Furthermore, sometimes The Merchant of Venice is not a play at all, at least not a stage 
play; it is a film, and it opens with the history of the ghetto, conveyed through austere 
blocs of white text, superimposed with scenes of pogroms; the film is available on DVD 
and VHS, and streaming on YouTube with Spanish subtitles.  
To claim that the text of The Merchant of Venice is shaped by cultural and historical, 
and even nonhuman forces is hardly a provocative gesture. Indeed, it’s a gesture 
completely in line with the sort of historical materialist critique espoused by Alex 
Galloway; and, in its illumination of the complex interrelationships between human 
culture and history and non-human entities like media technology and ideology, it is 
indeed a valuable tool – within the limited scope of its range of action. As indicated in 
the above discussion of Galloway’s critique of realism, such historical materialist 
hermeneutics frequently adhere to a zero-sum conception of literature – accounting 
for it exclusively in terms of historical determination, while neglecting the possible 
being of a text that is simultaneously historically determined and withdrawn. The two-
faced ontological status of the object that is literature (a status that is characteristic of 
all being) is discernible in the case of The Merchant of Venice illustrated above. There is 
nothing remarkable in the fact that a process of cultural-historical determination 
produces shifting interpretations, narratives, and receptions of a literary text. What is 
important here is the fact that, despite the chaotic shifting of historical and 
interpretative profiles of The Merchant of Venice, the text is still recognizably The Merchant 
of Venice. There is something in this play, and in the literary text, that holds together, 
and maintains the coherence of the text as the text. There is a text-ness to the text, a 
coherence of being that is held back beyond the reach of the ever-shifting play of 
interpretations presented and represented on the surface – a stable and inaccessible 
play, behind the shifting and perceivable surface play. 
It no longer seems an exercise in eccentricity to juxtapose this description of The 
Merchant of Venice with the, decidedly more succinct, description Graham Harman 
provides of an object as ‘anything that has a unified reality that is autonomous from its 
wider context and also from its own pieces.’25 It is not sufficient, however, to conclude 
from this example that the literary text is an object – at least, not merely an object. For 
the text here is not merely unified and autonomous, it is also withdrawn and 
25 Harman, The Quadruple Object, p. 116. 
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inaccessible. In this, the text meets the ontological criteria for a real object, as described 
by Harman: 
 an object is real when it forms an autonomous unit able to withstand certain 
changes in its pieces. This does not require additional relations with other 
entities, since we have seen that the real object lies deeper than such relations and 
often enters them with no lasting effect to itself.26 
It seems that we are now pointing in the direction of something like an essence at the 
core of the object that is the text – a concept that seems in danger of affirming the 
historical materialist critique of speculative realism as an essentialist philosophy. And 
indeed, Harman does include essence in his ontology, as part of a fourfold model 
structure of being, which he extrapolates and develops from the infamously obscure 
fourfold model of Martin Heidegger. Beyond its central role in Harman’s ontology, the 
examination of this fourfold model is important if we hope to address: first, the 
difference between the essence defined in Harman’s thought, and the essence defined 
in traditional realist thought; and, second, the limitations of Harman’s object-oriented 
ontology in accounting for agency and change, the addressing of which points us 
toward DeLanda. 
In Harman’s fourfold, two of the poles correspond to two types of objects – sensual 
objects, which are accessible to perception and experience, and shadowy real objects, 
which are entirely withdrawn from access. On the opposite end of this model, Harman 
places two poles corresponding to the two types of qualities, the features and traits 
exhibited by an object that ‘makes it what it is for those who perceive it.’27 As Harman 
describes it, the ‘tensions’ between these four poles result in the production of four 
dimensions of reality. For our purposes, we will concern ourselves for the moment with 
a single one of these four tensions: the tension between a real object and its real 
qualities. Since a real object is defined in terms of its inaccessibility and withdrawal, 
this tension between the real object and real qualities is necessarily enacted under 
conditions of the utmost withdrawal, in the deepest and most medieval dungeons of 
tool-being. Harman designates the dimension produced by way of this tension as 
essence. Crucially, Harman clarifies, in contrast to the conventional model of essence 
that ‘treated real qualities as mobile universals able to be exemplified anywhere, 
qualities according to the present book are shaped by the object to which they 
belong.’28 This description of essence is useful for us, first of all, in the insight it 
provides into charges of politically oppressive ‘essentialism’ leveled at the ontologies of 
SR, OOO, and OOP by Galloway and others of historicist/materialist inclination – 
26 Harman, The Quadruple Object, p. 123. 
27 Harman, The Quadruple Object, p. 101. 
28 Harman, The Quadruple Object, p.101. 
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we can now see the manner in which such a charge is premised upon what Harman 
designates as the ‘traditional model of essence,’ as a mobile universal standard, a sort 
of colonizing and policing dimension that enacts homogenization wherever it 
manifests itself. 
In the interest of further explicating the object of the literary text in terms of its 
being both historically emergent and withdrawn, we will have to depart from 
Harman’s object-oriented philosophy and the Latourian lineage of speculation, and 
turn our attention to the more overtly Deleuzian-flavored variety of realism (we must 
take care here to remain conscious of the fact that in doing this we are, in a sense, 
ascribing to notions of history based upon the notion of a linear telos – a notion that we 
will soon find ourselves compelled to contradict as we further investigate the particular 
object that is the literary text). In turning toward the more overtly Deleuzian line of 
speculation, examined in what follows by way of the work of Manuel DeLanda, we 
can address what has now become clear as one of the problems with the application of 
Harman’s ontology to the literary text – namely, the manner in which the withdrawn 
essence of the object precludes any contact, any encounter whatsoever. For, the act of 
reading and interpretation is – at, it seems, its most fundamental level – an act of 
meeting, an act of encounter. Harman’s universe of concealed and withdrawn objects 
is valuable here, in its explication of the way in which a literary text holds together as a 
discrete and real object, but offers us little insight into the activities and processes of 
reading, interpretation, and circulation involved in the work of literature – for this, his 
essences remain too withdrawn, too held-back in their held-togetherness.  
Perhaps the most basic and colloquial definition of the work of the study of 
literature pertains to the notion of meaning – what does a particular 
text/paradigm/etc mean in a particular context? In this, the Deleuzian notion of 
essence, as explicated by Brian Massumi in A User’s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
offers us a useful point of divergence from that described by Harman. As Massumi 
relates, ‘Deleuze and Guattari occasionally call meaning “essence.”’29 This occasional 
synonymy is more than merely semantic, as we shall see – and, as with Harman, 
essence/meaning is not to be understood in the traditional mobile-colonial sense that 
is critiqued from the perspective of historical materialism. In the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari, essence assumes the form of an ‘encounter’ or ‘event’ that is ‘neither stable 
nor transcendental,’ but is instead ‘immanent to the dynamic process it expresses.’30 
The usefulness, for our purposes, of such an understanding of meaning – the product, 
29 Brian Massumi, A User’s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and 
Guattari, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1992, p. 17. 
30 Massumi, A User’s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 17. 
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so to speak, of the work of literary interpretation – becomes more clear with Massumi’s 
summation, in subsequent pages: a ‘meaning is an encounter between force fields. 
More specifically, it is the “essence” (diagram, abstract machine) of that encounter. Its 
own essence (the meaning of meaning) is the incorporeal transformation, which comes 
in many varieties.’31 The essence/meaning of the literary text, in this conception, 
functions as an interface between two distinct forms: first, the form of content, or, the 
order and organization of qualities and signs to be read; and, second, the form of 
expression, or, the order and organization of functions and the activity of being-
something of the text. Essence assumes the character of the meeting place between 
these two forms – the event of the encounter between the form of content and the 
form of expression. 
It is this nomadic conception of essence and meaning – as an event, an encounter 
– that underwrites Manuel DeLanda’s own notion of essence, which is one of outright 
opposition to any essentialism whatsoever. The influence of the Deleuzian conception 
of meaning/essence upon DeLanda’s discussion of his notion of memory is apparent, 
albeit in a significantly transformed and modified form, in (among other places) 
DeLanda’s most recent book, Philosophy and Simulation: The Emergence of Synthetic Reason. 
For the purposes of what follows, it will be necessary to, once again, clarify some of the 
terminology employed hereafter – specifically, the terms memory and history. At the 
outset of this project, we established for ourselves the – perhaps, overly ambitious – 
task of discussing the work of literature in the context of the literary text’s ontological 
status as a real and physical object that participates in a system of history and memory. 
The terms are employed here and, it seems, in DeLanda’s text, as follows: memory 
corresponds to the informational storage capacity of an entity at the level of the 
individual object; while history corresponds to the capacity for the storage, 
organization, and transmission of information of a system of individual, discrete 
objects. 
The Deleuzian flavor to DeLanda’s ontology is especially apparent, as mentioned 
above, in his discussion of the content of the memories of mammals and birds, in the 
seventh chapter of Philosophy and Simulation, ‘Neural Nets and Mammalian Memory.’ At 
the chapter’s outset, DeLanda establishes a distinction, which will be valuable to our 
understanding of the different types of work performed over the course of the work of 
literature – the distinction between the concepts of significance and signification. DeLanda 
writes: 
The content of autobiographical memories in animals must be thought of as 
endowed with significance not with signification, which is a linguistic notion. The 
31 Massumi, A User’s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 33. 
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significance of a scene or event is related to its capacity to make a difference in an 
animal’s life, to its capacity to affect and be affected by the animal’s actions, while 
signification is a semantic notion referring to the meaning of words or 
sentences.32 
DeLanda’s distinction between significance and signification is valuable here, in its 
description of the real and physical affective capacity of memory at the level of the 
individual animal or, for our purposes, the level of the individual object – a category 
which we have expanded to encompass every discrete entity, including the individual 
work of literature.  
What is less clear here, with regards to DeLanda, is why the linguistic notion of 
signification cannot also be understood as one of significance. For, if we are to proceed 
further down the speculative realist rabbit hole – or at least that of the bricoleur 
Harman/DeLanda variety which we have been here examining – we must likewise 
accept language itself as a real and physical object, which cannot be reduced upward 
to its wider context (mediation of reality, exchange of ideas, what have you), or 
downward to its component parts (phonemes, neurological manifestation/processing, 
cultural make-up). Accepting such a premise points us in the direction of further 
potential resonance between he ontological models of our two primary interlocutors, 
Graham Harman and Manuel DeLanda. For, in light of such a notion, we can 
attempt a reconciliation with one of the more troubling aspects of Harman’s ontology: 
the withdrawal of the object from access – a notion that is advantageous in its 
accounting for the work of literature in terms of its being a complete and discrete 
object but, equally, problematic in its preclusion of anything more than vicarious 
interaction and causality.  
We can, however, perhaps modify this notion of withdrawal for our purposes if we 
approach it in the context of DeLanda’s conception, laid out in Philosophy and 
Simulation, of memory and language in terms of their function as storage mechanisms. 
The resonance between the terms withdrawal and storage is more than merely semantic 
– both entail a holding-together predicated upon a holding-back, in the form of 
withdrawn and stored energetic potential, the storing away of the capacity for 
significance. DeLanda elaborates upon the concept further in the eighth chapter of 
Philosophy and Simulation, ‘Multiagents and Primate Strategies,’ in which the scale of 
focus is expanded from that of the individual agent (the level corresponding to 
memory), to that of systems of multiple agents interacting with each other (the level 
corresponding to history, in our formulation). DeLanda begins with the discussion of 
32 Manuel DeLanda, Philosophy and Simulation: The Emergence of Synthetic Reason, London, Continuum, 2011, p. 
94. 
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the emergence of language in Neolithic human communities, and the manner in 
which the ‘rapid transmission of linguistic information’ allowed early Stone Age 
communities ‘to act as a reputation-storage mechanism.’33 However, crucially, such a 
‘reputation-storage mechanism’ is not predicated exclusively upon linguistic 
development for, as DeLanda points out, archeological evidence suggests, ‘a complex 
social life preexisted the emergence of language.’34  
What is crucial here, in terms of its application to our understanding of the object 
that is the work of literature, is not so much the notion of a properly linguistic storage 
mechanism, but rather of a distributed network of memory and cognition, of which 
the linguistic dimension (hitherto, the focus of the vast majority of studies of literary 
history) is no more than one dimension among multiple dimensions/pathways of 
significance, beyond those limited to semantic questions of signification. Exploring this 
chaotic distributed system of cognition and significance offers a daunting task for the 
humanities that traditionally rely upon, unsurprisingly, the enshrined principles and 
paradigms of humanistic critique. These paradigms are valuable, undoubtedly, and 
will continue to be so – however, in the face of ever-expanding systems of energy and 
distributed cognition, an augmented conceptual toolkit is long overdue. The anti-
critical, or perhaps non-critical, stance of object-oriented ontologies such as that of 
Harman, in conjunction with the turn to simulation and science, as exemplified by 
DeLanda and Latour, offers to the humanities just such a kit. 
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